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PROPERTY-REAL COVENANTS-HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS:
A LEASE WILL NOT CONVEY RIGHTS IN COMMON PROPERTIES.
Hannum v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Association, 272
Ark. 49, 611 S.W.2d 756 (1981).
Appellants, who were property owners in Bella Vista Village,
took title to their property subject to restrictive covenants, one of
which provided that "every member and associate member, so long
as the associate membership shall continue, shall have a right and
easement of enjoyment in and to the Common Properties and such
easement shall be appurtenant to and shall pass with the title to
every Lot or Living Unit."' The appellants sued the property own-
ers' association and the members of its board of directors, who con-
trolled the use of the common properties.2 They contended that the
appellees prevented them from transferring, by lease of their lots,
the easement of enjoyment in the common properties acquired with
the purchase of a lot in the development. They sought a declaratory
judgment giving them the right to lease these interests along with
the lease of a lot.
The lower court held that the right to use the common proper-
ties resides in the holder of the title. The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the easement for the use of common proper-
ties is determined by title only and does not pass with a lease of the
land. The court held that the rules applicable to appurtenant ease-
ments for rights of way do not govern the rights of members or asso-
ciate members in common properties in a development. Hannum v.
Bella Vista Village Property Owners Association, 272 Ark. 49, 611
S.W.2d 756 (1981).
Either directly or by implication, the Hannum decision raises
three distinct concepts in property law: appurtenant easements,
easements in gross, and real covenants. Easements are similar to
real covenants in that both represent limited interests in property
belonging to another and that both may run with the land. They
differ, however, in their origins, development, and enforcement.
An easement is a right held by one person which entitles him to
1. Hannum v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 272 Ark. 49, 49, 611 S.W.2d
756, 756 (1981).
2. The common properties include tennis courts, lakes, golf courses, and the country
club. Id. at 49, 611 S.W.2d at 756.
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make limited use of land belonging to another.3 Easements were
first recognized in the law in 1607, 4 although they were not analyzed
and categorized until direct access to and from markets became an
issue important to nineteenth century industrialists.5 As rights in
rem, easements passed with possession of the land and were en-
forceable in courts of equity, attributes which they retain today.6
An easement is a property right and is entitled to the full panoply of
constitutional protections.7 An easement may be affirmative, per-
mitting its holder to use the land of another in given ways, or it may
be negative, forbidding a property owner to make given uses of his
own land.'
An appurtenant easement is annexed to specific lands.9 It con-
fers a benefit on one parcel of land, the dominant tenement, and
places a burden on another, the servient tenement.' 0 The dominant
and servient tenements are usually adjacent." Appurtenant ease-
ments run with the land, whether the conveyance refers to them or
not.' 2 An appurtenant easement may not be severed from the domi-
nant estate' 3 and may not be converted into an easement in gross.'
4
Like an appurtenant easement, an easement in gross creates a
limited interest in one person in the property of another. In con-
3. E.g., 5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, §§ 450-451 (1944).
4. First in Gateward's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 59b, 77 Eng. Rep. 344 (1607) and again shortly
thereafter in Peers v. Lucy, 4 Mod. 355, 87 Eng. Rep. 441 (1695). Limited rights in the land
of another were said to arise by grant or by prescription through actual use of the land for a
way. These latter interests were customary rights in the nature of easements. They were
distinguished in English law from true easements, which were firmly established as being
appurtenant to a dominant estate. 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 316-26
(1952).
5. 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 323.
6. The person entitled to the easement may bring an action for an injunction where the
injury complained of is irreparable, the interference is of a permanent and continuous char-
acter, or the remedy at law, in the form of damages, does not afford adequate relief. For
equitable relief to be granted, the existence of the right must be clear and not at issue. Com-
pare McGill v. Miller, 172 Ark. 390, 288 S.W. 932 (1926) with Bridwell v. Arkansas Power &
Light Co., 191 Ark. 227, 85 S.W.2d 712 (1935); Annot., 47 A.L.R. 552, 557 (1927).
7. E.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Davis, 247 Ark. 381, 445 S.W.2d 505 (1969).
8. E.g., 3 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 756 (3rd ed. 1939).
9. E.g., 2 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 321, 54 (Grimes ed. 1980): "If the prime beneficiary of the easement is another tract of
land regardless of who owns such tract then the easement is 'appurtenant.'"
10. E.g., 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 8, § 758.
11. E.g., id., § 762.
12. E.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 487(e); Warren v. Cudd, 261 Ark. 690, 550
S.W.2d 773 (1977).
13. E.g., 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 322, at 63.
14. E.g., id., § 322, at 64; Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R.I. 495, 23 A. 20 (1891).
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trast, however, an easement in gross is not bound to a dominant
tenement, and does not run with the land. 15 It exists as a personal
right of one of the parties.16 Easements in gross are not favored in
the law 17 and as a general rule, courts will construe an easement as
appurtenant when there is ambiguity in the grant.'8  Arkansas
courts, however, have been quick to construe easements as ease-
ments in gross when the facts would support such a holding.' 9
There is little disagreement about the law governing easements.
However, the law governing real covenants, another method of cre-
ating limited interests in the property of another, is not so well set-
tled. Scholars disagree about the origins of real covenants, 20 but
they do agree that real covenants were recognized in the law as early
as 1583.21 The complex notions surrounding real covenants are a
consequence of England's feudal system of land tenure.22 The en-
forceability of promises made to lords of the manor was important
to the maintenance of that system.23 Adaptation of real covenants
to American usage has added to the complexity.24
15. Eg, Bank of Hoxie v. Meriwether, 166 Ark. 39, 47, 265 S.W. 642, 645 (1924). An
easement in gross may be either commercial or personal. The distinction is important be-
cause commercial easements in gross are viewed as assignable, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 489, but personal easements in gross are neither assignable nor inheritable unless
the grant so specifies, e.g., Field v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148, 114 S.W. 206 (1908).
16. Eg., 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 8, § 758, at 101 (Supp. 1981).
17. Use of an ordinary appurtenant easement is limited by the demands of the domi-
nant tenement. Because there are no inherent natural limits to an easement in gross, it may
easily impose a surcharge on the servient tenement, and it needlessly encumbers land titles.
Sturley, Easements in Gross, 96 L.Q. REV. 557 (1980).
18. Eg., Houston v. Zahm, 44 Or. 610, 76 P. 641 (1904).
19. Eg., Rose Lawn Cemetery Ass'n v. Scott, 229 Ark. 639, 317 S.W.2d 265 (1958); Ft.
Smith Gas Co. v. Gean, 186 Ark. 573, 55 S.W.2d 63 (1932); Field v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148, 114
S.W. 206 (1908).
20. Compare 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 395-401 (1923); with C. CLARK, REAL
COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND", 122-24 (2d ed. 1947); and
Stoebuck, Running Covenants.- An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861, 865 (1977).
Judge Clark collects and analyzes American cases involving real covenants to the year 1938.
Collected cases from 1938 to 1978 are analyzed in Note, Covenants Running with the Land
Viable Doctrine or Common-Law Relic?, 42 HOFSTRA U.L. REV. 139 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Covenants]. For an excellent brief review of the ancient case law relating to real
covenants refer to Sims, The Law ofReal Covenants. Exceptions to the Restatement of the
Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORN. L.Q. 1, 1-19 (1944).
21. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
22. E.g., C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 8-9, 27
(1962).
23. E.g., id.
24. "[T]here has been little or no tendency to relax the technical requirements . . . in
relation to the running of the burden of promises respecting the use of land." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 3, Intr. Note, Part III, at 3160.
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As rights in personam, real covenants are promises or agree-
ments concerning an estate in land which will govern the cove-
nanting parties in the use of the land and which is so connected with
the land that heirs and assignees of either the promisee or promisor
may enforce the agreement in an action at law.25 Traditionally,
there are four requirements2 6 which must be met in order to create a
covenant which will run27 with an estate in land. First, an agree-
ment or promise in writing is required.28 Second, the parties to the
covenant must intend, at the time the covenant is created, that it run
with an estate in land.29 Third, the covenant must "touch and con-
cern" the land. 0 Fourth, the parties must be in privity of estate.'
25. E.g., 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 8, § 848.
26. Eg., Covenants, supra note 20, at 141-46.
27. "[R]unningness" is connected with the acquisition of some sort of interest in
land; the benefit or burden is said to "run with" land or with an estate in land. In
the law of contracts, rights or benefits may be assigned and duties or burdens dele-
gated by the original parties. In the branch of property law dealing with running
covenants, express assignment or delegation does not occur. Rather, remote per-
sons are benefited or burdened because they acquire an interest in land that carries
the benefit or burden along with it, provided certain other conditions required by
law are met.
Stoebuck, supra note 20, at 863-64.
28. The first requirement usually presents few problems because the Statute of Frauds
requires that contracts for interests in land be in writing. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 522.
29. The second requirement entails a subjective test. See Covenants, supra note 20, at
142. The court must determine whether at the time the parties entered their agreement, they
each intended to bind their heirs and successors with the burdens or benefits of the covenant.
A few courts have required that the covenant contain specific language, such as "heirs,"
"assigns," or "successors," which might indicate such intent. Eg., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, § 9.3 (A. J. Casner ed. 1974); Ft. Smith Gas Co. v. Gean, 186 Ark. 573, 55
S.W.2d 63 (1932) (absence of the word "assigns" indicated intent that covenant should not
run). Arkansas, like most jurisdictions, has eliminated the need for specific language and
holds that any words will suffice which demonstrate the intention of the parties. Sabin v.
Hamilton, 2 Ark. 485 (1840); e.g., 3 H. TIFFANY supra note 8, § 854, at 460; Casebeer v.
Beacon Realty, Inc., 248 Ark. 22, 449 S.W.2d 701 (1970) (doubts are construed against re-
strictions and in favor of free use of the land); Shermer v. Haynes, 248 Ark. 255, 451 S.W.2d
445 (1970) (impermissible uses of land must be clearly stated); Faust v. Little Rock School
Dist., 224 Ark. 761, 276 S.W.2d 59 (1955) (when there is uncertainty in the language, free-
dom from restraint will be decreed); Linder Corp. v. Pyeatt, 222 Ark. 949, 264 S.W.2d 619
(1954) (improper to inquire into the purpose of the covenant if there is no ambiguity);
Vaughan v. Matlock, 23 Ark. 9 (1861) (language of the instrument and surrounding circum-
stances if there is ambiguity).
Of the 4 requisites necessary to create a real covenant, Arkansas cases have tended to
emphasize the intention of the parties. Eg., Hays v. Watson, 250 Ark. 589, 466 S.W.2d 272
(1971); Bank of Hoxie v. Meriwether, 166 Ark. 39, 265 S.W. 642 (1924); Field v. Morris, 88
Ark. 148, 114 S.W. 206 (1908); Gaster v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 325 (1839).
30. The third requirement that the covenant "touch and concern" the land requires an
objective determination by the court whether the covenant relates to the land itself or is
merely personal to one or both of the parties. See Covenants, supra note 20, at 142. Judge
Clark suggested that two questions are involved in making this determination. One is
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Much of the disagreement surrounding real covenants has in-
volved the concept of privity of estate. Enforcement of the burdens
of real covenants has drawn opposition from some courts and schol-
ars,32 who think that the burdens imposed by real covenants are un-
necessary encumbrances on land titles which inhibit free
marketability. 33 For this reason, the courts have drawn careful dis-
tinctions between the running of the burden and the running of the
benefit. 34 in making these distinctions, various types of privity of
estate have been identified, and various jurisdictions require the
existence of specific types of privity before they will permit the bur-
den to run.35 Few courts or scholars view the running of the benefit
whether the value of the covenantor's interest is diminished by the burden of the covenant; if
so, this means the covenant touches and concerns that land. The other is whether the value
of the covenantee's interest is enhanced by the benefit of the covenant, which, if it is, would
mean that the covenant touches and concerns that land. C. CLARK, .Up/ra note 20, at 97
(citing Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. REv. 639 (1914)). This is
the test applied in Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank, 278
N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
The Arkansas court also applies an objective test. The real covenant must confer some
benefit on the land. Eg., Bank of Hoxie v. Meriwether, 166 Ark. 39, 265 S.W. 642 (1924).
The real covenant must increase the value of the land, or make it more beneficial or
covenient to those who own it or live on it. Eg., Nordin v. May, 188 F.2d 411 (8th Cir.
1951).
31. The requirement of privity of estate is complex. Judges of the early common law
courts were understandably cautious about extending the rights and duties implicit in cove-
nants to persons who had not made the contractual promises. The concept of privity of
estate furnished a basis upon which subsequent grantees of the covenantor and covenantee
might be required by the law courts to perform the covenants. C. CLARK, supra note 20, at
111-43; Covenants, supra note 20, at 145-52.
32. Eg., Stoebuck, supra note 20, at 885.
33. Eg., C. CLARK, supra note 20, at 132-33.
34. Eg., Stoebuck, supra note 20, at 878-82.
35. Briefly, the types of privity of estate which have been held necessary to support the
burden of a covenant running with an estate in land are (1) mutual privity, which exists
when two persons hold separate interests in the same land at the same time; (2) horizontal
privity, which exists when property is transferred from one person to another; and (3) verti-
cal privity, which exists when one of the covenanting parties subsequently conveys his inter-
est, or part of it, to a third person. C. CLARK, supra note 20, at 111-15; Stoebuck, supra note
20, at 876-82; Covenants, supra note 20, at 145-46.
Mutual privity is most restrictive, and was required by Justice Holmes during his tenure
on the Massachusetts court. Vertical privity is least restrictive; the chief proponent of this
type of privity was Judge Clark. The Restatement of Property requires a combination: ver-
tical and horizontal or vertical and mutual. Further, the Restatement does not permit the
burden to run unless some land is benefited. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 537.
Many modern courts use the concept of privity of estate as a device to limit the running
of real covenants because of their inhibiting effect on marketability. In England and in
several American jurisdictions, the detrimental effects of encumbered land titles and inter-
ference with the free flow of the market are thought to outweigh the benefits which accrue
from the use of real covenants. C. CLARK, supra note 20, at 132-33 nn.118, 119 & 120.
Other courts think that subjecting the land to reasonable restrictions is an aid to planned
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of a real covenant as problematical, 36 since the benefit of a promise
either enhances or does not detract from the marketability of land.37
"Few object to buying land entitled to the benefit of a promise.
3
The Arkansas court seldom speaks of the requirement of privity
of estate. The court has not specified the type of privity required,
even in those cases in which privity of estate has been regarded as
essential to the running of the burdens and benefits of real
covenants.
39
Arkansas has permitted successors in interest to enforce the
benefit of covenants running with the land,4° although prior to the
Hannum case, Arkansas had apparently never ruled on the issue
whether a lessee may enforce the benefit.4 ' Other courts have held
development and orderly growth and that this benefit offsets any detrimental effect real cov-
enants may have on marketability. Id. at 134-37. The stringency with which the privity
requirement is imposed is frequently an index to the views of the particular court regarding
ready marketability on the one hand and planned development on the other.
36. E.g., Stoebuck, supra note 20, at 880-81.
37. E.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 548. Benefits run more readily than burdens
because they are said to enhance marketability. Further, enforcement of the benefits of real
covenants poses few theoretical problems because "it seems clear that the same result can
ordinarily be reached by an assignment of the covenantee's rights or under the contract
doctrine of third-party beneficiaries." Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1022, at 1024 (1959). Some au-
thorities state that there is dual liability in the covenantor when real covenants are contained
in a conveyance in fee. The covenantee has both contract rights based on privity of contract
and rights as the owner of the fee based on privity of estate. While he retains the benefited
land, the covenantee may sue based upon either privity of contract or privity of estate. As-
signees of the covenantee may sue based upon privity of contract. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 29, § 9.19.
38. Covenants, supra note 20, at 142. "This difficulty [permitting a man to bind another
who subsequently succeeds to land held by the first] . . . would seem more imagined than
real when we are dealing with the benefits, and not the burdens, of such covenants." City of
Reno v. Matley, 79 Nev. 49, 56, 378 P.2d 256, 259-60 (1963).
39. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651
(1975); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Sanders, 91 Ark. 153, 121 S.W. 337 (1909); St.
L., I.M. & S. Ry. v. O'Baugh, 49 Ark. 418, 5 S.W. 711 (1887). (In Kell, there is horizontal
privity; in Sanders, vertical; in O'Baugh, vertical.)
40. St. L., I.M. & S. Ry. v. O'Baugh, 49 Ark. 418, 5 S.W. 711 (1887) (covenantee's
grantee); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Sanders, 91 Ark. 153, 121 S.W. 337 (1909)
(life tenant).
41. Some authorities state that the inpersonam rights conferred by real covenants attach
only to successors to fee simple estates, and that since a lessee takes a lesser interest, he does
not succeed to the in personam covenant appended to the title. Compare 3 H. TIFFANY,
supra note 8, § 851 (concluding that authorities are divided on the question) with 2 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 29, § 9.20 (concluding that life tenants and lessees of the
covenantee may enforce the benefit).
Insofar as privity of estate has been recognized and required in Arkansas, no distinction
has been made between those cases in which the grantee has taken the exact estate of his
grantor and those in which he has succeeded to some lesser estate. Arkansas has permitted
enforcement of the benefit of a real covenant by a tenant holding a legal life estate and in
that lessees may do so, however. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the phrase "successors in title" in a deed was not a limita-
tion on the class of the covenantee's successors entitled to enforce
the covenant, but indicated the parties' intent that the covenant run
with the land, and therefore, lessees of the covenantee were entitled
to the benefit of the covenant.42
In Hannum, the real covenants governing property in Bella
Vista Village43 were construed for the second time by the Arkansas
Supreme Court. The first case, decided in 1975, was Kell v. Bella
Vista Village Property Owners Association," in which the Kells chal-
lenged a provision in the bill of assurance which said that unpaid
assessments for maintenance and improvements would be a contin-
uing lien on the property. The Kells contended that the covenants
were not real covenants which would run with the land 5 because
they did not "touch and concern" the land4 6 and because there was
no privity of estate. 7 The Arkansas Supreme Court found these
contentions to have "no merit,"4 8 citing the holding of the New
York Court of Appeals in Neponsit Property Owners' Association v.
doing so, cited for authority a case in which the tenant succeeded to the fee simple of her
grantor. Compare St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Sanders, 91 Ark. 153, 121 S.W. 337
(1909) (life tenant) with St. L., I.M. & S. Ry. v. O'Baugh, 49 Ark. 418, 5 S.W. 711 (1887)
(grantee).
42. Old Dominion Iron and Steel Corp. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 215 Va. 658,
212 S.E.2d 715 (1975).
43. For a discussion of the purpose and intent of real covenants like those adopted by
Bella Vista Village see R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 630.3151
(1979). In regard to establishing covenants that run with the land and make assessments
enforceable against the owner of the fee, Powell states that inclusion of the words, "or Living
Unit" will not extend membership in the Association to tenants in rental property, "but it
will make it clear that the landlord has membership rights with respect to each unit which he
can delegate to his tenants under the leases. ... Id. 630.3151 n.14.
In his explanation of the language of the real covenants governing Bella Vista Village
which was at issue in Hannum, "[E]very Member shall have a right and easement of enjoy-
ment in and to the Common Properties and such easement shall be appurtenant to and pass
with the title to every Lot [or Living Unit]," Powell refers to Maranatha Settlement Ass'n v.
Evans, 385 Pa. 208, 122 A.2d 679 (1956). 4A POWELL, supra, 630.3151 n.24. This case
holds that the language, "The Grantee and his immediate family only, shall enjoy the free
use of the swimming pool," created an appurtenant easement. Maranatha Settlement Ass'n
v. Evans, 385 Pa. 208, 209, 122 A.2d 679, 680 (1956).
44. 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651 (1975).
45. Brief for Appellants, 47-56, Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 258
Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651 (1975).
46. Id. at 48-52.
47. Id. at 52-56.




Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 49 and held that the declarations
and covenants constituted real covenants running with the land at
law. The holding in Kell enforced the burden side of the real cove-
nants governing property in Bella Vista Village. Since Kell was
founded on the authority of Neponst,50 it is worth noting that Ne-
ponsit permitted assignees of the covenantee to enforce the burden
of that covenant. 5'
The Hannum case relies heavily upon the protective covenants
of the Bella Vista Village Property Owners Association to define the
rights of the appellants. The court noted that the covenants "de-
scribe a member as the developer or a record owner of a fee interest,
and an associate member as one purchasing under a contract with
the developer. '52 The court reasoned that a lessee falls into neither
of the foregoing categories and concluded that the easement of en-
joyment in the common properties may not be transferred with a
lease of the land.53
Appellants argued that the language of the declaration and cov-
enants granted an appurtenant easement rather than a personal
49. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). In this, the leading case in the enforcement of
the burdens of real covenants by homeowners' associations, assignees of the grantor of lots
in a subdivision brought suit to foreclose a lien created by a covenant in a deed. The cove-
nant provided that unpaid annual charges for maintenance of common areas would create a
lien on the land which would be enforceable by a property owners' association to be created
thereafter. The covenant further provided that it would run with the land. The grantor
assigned the benefit of this covenant to the homeowners' association, which owned no land
in the subdivision. The defendant, a remote grantee of the original covenantor, took title
subject to restrictions and covenants in the deed. In its decision, the New York Supreme
Court stated that to create a covenant which would run with an estate in land, (1) it must
appear that the covenanting parties intended the covenant to run, (2) the covenant must
"touch and concern" the land, and (3) there must be privity of estate between the assignee
of the covenantee and the assignee of the covenantor. The court found the first requirement
stated in the covenant. The "touch and concern" requirement was tested by the questions
suggested by Judge Clark (Note 30 supra) and the court held that the defendant's land was
benefited by the required maintenance and that the burden should rest upon the land bene-
fited. The court, having said that privity of estate was necessary to the running of the bur-
den of the covenant, avoided the problem of lack of privity of estate by looking through the
corporate form of the plaintiff. It is not clear which type of privity was required, but there
was horizontal privity between the original covenanting parties and there was vertical priv-
ity between the covenantor and his successive grantees, the defendants. However, there was
no privity of estate between the original covenantee and the plaintiff homeowners' associa-
tion. Nonetheless, the court found that in substance if not in form, the association and the
defendant were in privity of estate, and enforced the covenant.
50. 258 Ark. at 760, 528 S.W.2d at 653.
51. 278 N.Y. at 262, 15 N.E.2d at 797.
52. Hannum v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 272 Ark. 49, 49, 611 S.W.2d
756, 756 (1981).
53. Id. at 50, 611 S.W.2d at 757.
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right in the title holder,54 and that the easement, being appurtenant,
necessarily ran with the land.5" They further argued that the lease
of a lot gave the lessee the right to use the easement because an
appurtenant easement may not be severed from the dominant es-
tate.56 The court dismissed these arguments as inapplicable,57 dis-
tinguishing ordinary appurtenant easements for rights of way and
access to property from an easement of enjoyment in the common
properties in a development.5 The court held that the right to use
the common properties is determined by title, as defined in the cove-
nants,59 and therefore, a lease would not pass the right to use the
common properties.60 The court ruled that because appellants re-
mained free to lease their houses and lots without the easement to
anyone they chose, no restraint on alienation was created.
6'
Arkansas has, in dictum, recognized real covenants as property
rights. In Arkansas State Highway Commission v. McNeil, 62 the
court said that it did "not deny the existence of a property right in
the appellees," and that the restrictive covenant may have given ad-
ded value to the land when they bought it.63 If the criterion for
designation of real covenants as property rights is that the covenants
must add value to the land, then the real covenants at issue in Han-
num would qualify. In the Kell opinion, the Arkansas court stated




57. Id. at 51.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Cf. Town of Kearny v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 143 N.J. Super. 449,
459, 363 A.2d 390, 396 (1976) (holding that because of the nonpossessory character of the
interest in land which was in the possession of another, the interest created was an easement
in gross. The court said that, "by definition, an easement is placed outside the scope of the
concept designated by the term 'lease' and, concomitantly, outside the scope of a restriction
against subletting.")
61. Hannum v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 272 Ark. 49, 51, 611 S.W.2d
756, 757 (1981).
62. 238 Ark. 244, 381 S.W.2d 425 (1964).
63. Id. at 248, 381 S.W.2d at 427. And see the dissent, stating that, "A restrictive cove-
nant such as we have here is a property right. Such was impliedly recognized in Linder
Corp. v. Pyeatt, 222 Ark. 249, 264 S.W.2d 619." Id. at 250, 381 S.W.2d at 428 (McFaddin, J.,
dissenting). The dissent collects cases and citations to support its position. Federal law
holds that restrictive covenants are property rights. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal
Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950). The decisions are split, but most courts seem to recognize real
covenants as property rights. 17 A.L.R. 554 (1922); 67 A.L.R. 385 (1930).
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each lot or living unit subject to the real covenants. 64 Ownership of
property, by definition, encompasses the right to dispose of it, and
attempts to restrain alienation are void if they are unreasonable.65
Based on the foregoing, it would appear that real covenants are
rights in property acquired at the time the property is purchased;
that exercise of the rights of ownership may not be restrained or
diminished by the grantor; and that the benefit of the covenants
should be enforceable at law.
The Hannum case leaves a number of questions unanswered.
Given the existence of Kell as precedent for construction of the real
covenants governing Bella Vista Village, it would have been most
logical for the appellants to argue that the decision in Kell required
an affirmative decision in Hannum. Because the Kell decision con-
strued these to be covenants which run with the land and because
that decision enforced the burden of the covenants, it would have
been logical for the appellants to argue that the benefit of the cove-
nants should be enforced in Hannum. Inexplicably, appellants did
not make this argument.66 Although the appurtenant easement rep-
resents only one of several benefits conferred by the real covenants,
the appellants argued only that the covenants granted an appurte-
nant easement and that the easement ran with the land.67 The Ar-
kansas court rejected this argument by its holding in Hannum;
however, the court did not specify the type of interest the property
owners now have in the common properties. It may be inferred that
they hold only an easement in gross, which is inalienable. As for the
real covenants recognized in Kell, the court did not state under what
conditions these would run. By inference, they do not run with the
land unless a freehold estate is conveyed.
It is difficult to assess the impact the decision may have on Ar-
64. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 760, 528 S.W.2d
651, 653 (1973).
65. In Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296, 317-18 (1890), the Court said:
[U]pon the absolute transfer of an estate, the grantor cannot, by any restrictions or
limitations contained in the instrument of transfer, defeat or annul the conse-
quences which the law annexes to the estate thus transferred. If, for instance, upon
the transfer of an estate in fee, the conveyance should provide. . . that the grantee
should have no power of disposition over it, the provision, in either of these cases,
would clearly be inoperative and void, because the act or thing forbidden is a right
or incident which the law annexes to every estate in fee. ...
An attempt to preclude the mortgage or lease of property is void as a restraint on aliena-
tion. E.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 406(f) 111.7.
66. Brief for Appellants, 94-117, Hannum v. Bella Vista Property Owners' Ass'n, 272
Ark. 49, 611 S.W.2d 756 (1981).
67. Id. at 96-106.
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kansas' property law. The past several years have brought wide-
spread development of horizontal property regimes, popularly
known as condominiums. 68 These developments are typically gov-
erned by statutes, 69 the provisions of the master deed,7" and the by-
laws adopted by the property owners."' The Arkansas statutes pro-
vide that individuals shall own the interior walls of their allotted
spaces, and that all other structures and amenities, such as en-
trances, exits, hallways, elevators, and other installations for com-
mon use72 shall be held as common elements.73 The apartment
owner holds a pro-rata share in the common elements 74 and is per-
mitted to use them.75 The statutes also provide that individual
apartments may be conveyed as if independent of the other apart-
ments in the building.76 However, the question whether a lease will
pass the right of entry to the common elements will inevitably arise.
If a lease will not pass the right of entry to the common elements,
Hannum may make ownership of this kind of property less advanta-
geous than is popularly believed.
The legal problems posed by planned communities, cooperative
apartments, and condominiums, with their combinations of pri-
vately and commonly held properties, challenge the ingenuity of
lawyers and the courts. If the protection of common rights in prop-
erty is secured by sacrificing private property rights, however, buy-
ers may avoid developments incorporating common elements at a
time when more compact communities are socially desirable. In or-
der to make the informed decisions necessary to protect their respec-
tive interests, it is essential that buyers and developers know under
what circumstances Arkansas courts will, and will not, enforce real
covenants.
Modem variations in property ownership will generate other
cases raising the issues controverted in Hannum. Consequently, an
admonition delivered almost a decade ago is still apt: "The court
68. See, e.g., Nagin, The Condo Coniersion Craze: What's Happening in Florida? 55
FLA. B.J. 74 (1981); Woods, Time Sharing Comes to Faifield Bay, ARK. GAZETTE, Aug. 30,
1981 § C.
69. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1001 to -1023 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47AI-
A28 (1966); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.01-.27 (Page 1970).
70. Eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1009 (d) (1971).
71. Eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1014 to -1015 (1971).
72. Eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1002 (d) (1971).
73. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1006 (1971).
74. Id.
75. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1008 (1971).
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1011 (1971).
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must be precise so as not to confuse the related though distinct areas
of easements and covenants. . . . Proper use of the covenants de-
pends on precise statements of the rights and liabilities which ac-
company particular designations and restrictions in land
transfers."77
Virginia R. Williams
77. Comment, Judicial Handling of Restrictive Covenants in Arkansas Residential Subdi-
visions, 28 ARK. L. REv. 245, 261 (1974).
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